ON POWER & INDIAN COUNTRY
MAGGIE BLACKHAWK†
When we are young, the words are scattered all around
us. As they are assembled by experience, so also are
we, sentence by sentence, until the story takes shape.
― Louise Erdrich (Turtle Mountain Ojibwe)1
I. DAYS OF 20072
At the time I was admitted to Stanford Law School, I hadn’t met more
than a handful of lawyers. The handful that I had met, I had known only for
a few months, and they were the very women who had convinced me to apply
to law school in the first place. As a Native woman, daughter of a mother
who attended community college and who earned her degree after I left
home, I had quite a bit of learning to do.
One of the first things that I did was to tell George. George Redman,
born and raised on the Wind River Reservation in Wyoming and citizen of
the Northern Arapaho Nation, had worked with lawyers as a paralegal.
George knew where I could find some advice. That day, we drove the slow
road from Fort Washakie to Lander, where the attorneys had their office. The
drive was only about fifteen miles, but it was “off reservation”—that is,
outside of the borders of the Wind River Reservation. Driving off reservation
always made distances seem a bit farther. The towns were worlds apart,
separated by sovereignty, culture, language, and history.
We parked the pickup, dusty with reservation soil, in front of the law
firm office building. The nondescript, tan one-story was hidden behind trees
and housed the firm that had served then as the attorneys for the government
of the Northern Arapaho Nation. But Wyoming is such flat country that
every building looms large. George and I walked into the immaculate
western law office, carrying reservation dust along with us.
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1. LOUISE ERDRICH, THE PLAGUE OF DOVES 268 (2008).
2. These headings are a far too simple homage to the great Bill Rubenstein, who drafted an essay
to which we should all aspire. See generally William B. Rubenstein, Essay, My Harvard Law School, 39
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 317 (2004).
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He asked to speak with Berthenia Crocker, a named partner. “No, we
didn’t have an appointment and, no, she likely wasn’t expecting us.” But
Berthenia had worked in Indian Country long enough to understand Native
manners. George had worked for the law firm years before, they had an
established relationship, and he drove fifteen miles to ask for her advice. He
brought with him his family member, me, who had just been admitted to
Stanford Law School. If manners weren’t enough, we were certainly odd
enough to pique the interest. Berthenia took the meeting.
Nervousness has a way of locking in the details of memories. I
remember the shine of Berthenia’s desk when George and I first sat down. I
had never been in a lawyer’s office before, and I wasn’t sure I had ever seen
a space so clean and neatly organized. George spoke first and introduced us
both. Berthenia thanked him for coming by and, with a curious look, turned
to me. “Congratulations,” she said. “That is a great achievement. Do you
know what kind of law you are interested in?”
I looked up from the shine of her desk for the first time to see bobbed
blonde hair and a smile spread across a friendly face. “Federal Indian law,”
I said. I placed an awkward emphasis on “federal” because I had only
recently learned that Indian law made by the United States was called
federal, as opposed to tribal law or the law made by tribal governments.
“Oh,” Berthenia replied as only a specialist could, “that’s a big field. Are
you interested in any particular areas? Environmental law? Tax?”
Without hesitation, I replied: “jurisdiction.”
Jurisdiction is a technical term, belonging to the specialized parlance of
lawyers. In essence, jurisdiction means power—the ability to make and
apply the laws that govern daily life. First-year law students often hear the
word for the first time in their courses on civil procedure. But it isn’t until
their second or third year in law school that the meaning of jurisdiction
finally takes shape. However, even then the word remains technical—
stripped bare of any moral content.
Outside of Indian Country, justice rarely involves jurisdiction. Justice
is more often concerned with the language of rights. To the extent that justice
concerns itself with jurisdiction at all, it is to seek ways to expand the
jurisdiction of the federal courts to better protect rights. The simple story is
that rights are the protectors of justice, and federal courts are the protectors
of rights.
In Indian Country, this simple story doesn’t hold. Federal power was at
the heart of American colonialism, and federal rights have long been used to
further the colonial project. Instead, jurisdiction is synonymous with justice.
Jurisdiction is at the heart of sovereignty, and sovereignty is to Indian
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Country what air is to fire. Rather than the language of rights, it is the
language of sovereignty that empowers Native people. The language of
sovereignty offers us the power to build and shape a world of our own
choosing, to constitute a government of our own design, and to make laws
and define rights that fit Native values. To speak the language of sovereignty,
power, and jurisdiction is to aspire for more than the ability to beg for
protection by another’s government. Sovereignty offers the ability to govern.
“Jurisdiction?” Berthenia replied, still smiling. “Well, that’s the perfect
thing to study at law school.”
Before meeting Berthenia, Chai Feldblum and her team were the first
lawyers I had ever met in my life. At the time, I worked as a social science
researcher at the University of California, Los Angeles. I held a joint position
as manager of research on the Ethnography of Autism Project and as a senior
policy producer at the Center on the Everyday Lives of Families (CELF).
My position at CELF was created so I could work with Chai and her team to
translate our research on working families into more family-friendly
workplace policy.
The most remarkable thing about Chai and her team wasn’t that they
were all women; it was that they weren’t stereotypical lawyers. They were
“lobbyists” or, in Chai’s terminology, “legislative lawyers.”3 Rather than
bringing claims in courts, legislative lawyers took their arguments to
Congress, and although their arguments were at times framed in the language
of rights, they weren’t always so limited. Chai had risen to legislativelawyering fame when she helped draft and pass the Americans with
Disabilities Act as a lobbyist for the ACLU. As most first-year law students
learn, the Supreme Court had rejected special rights protection for
individuals with disabilities.4 By turning to the legislature and looking
beyond the language of rights as defined narrowly by the Court, Chai was
able to better protect a community that, because of its small numbers, might
never wield majority political power. Chai’s work showed again and again
that the simple story of rights and courts was too simple, and not just in
Indian Country.
At CELF, it was my job to support Chai and her team as they advocated
for better law. Over the course of a year, they taught me everything they
knew about the lawmaking process. They also eventually convinced me to
apply to law school.
3. See generally Chai Rachel Feldblum, The Art of Legislative Lawyering and the Six Circles of
Advocacy, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 785, 785–87 (2003).
4. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 435 (1985) (rejecting a higher
standard of scrutiny for discrimination against people with intellectual disabilities).
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After meeting Chai and Berthenia, I imagined that Stanford Law School
would offer courses on lawmaking, jurisdiction, power, and justice. I
imagined that I would study Congress and parliamentary procedure and join
student groups focused on legislative lawyering. I imagined that I would
learn about justice through a lens of power and an exploration of governance.
Through Chai and Berthenia, I had seen firsthand the power of wielding
jurisdiction and of taking one’s case to the lawmaking process for redress.
But the simple story still dominated at Stanford Law School. Lessons of
justice were taught entirely in the language of rights. Any concern with
jurisdiction or procedure often focused on the federal courts as protectors of
justice through rights.
Another glaring absence at the law school was any mention of “Indian
Country.” Scholars of Native Studies write in great depth about the process
of erasure of Native Nations and Native people as being central to American
colonialism. Paintings of empty Western landscapes and stories of the
disappearing Indian formed the heart of Manifest Destiny. But it is still hard
to articulate the experience of erasure as a Native person. It was even more
challenging to experience erasure as a Native person within an institution
that aimed to educate future leaders about the law.
The United States is the only government in the world to recognize
inherent tribal sovereignty and support Native Nations’ ability to selfgovern. Federal Indian law supports American exceptionalism in this regard.
Unlike Canada, New Zealand, and other countries, the United States
provides more legibility and visibility to Native Nations and Native peoples
within its domestic law than any other body of law in the world.5 Title 25 of
the United States Code is titled “Indians” and it, among other laws, governs
the relationship between the United States and the over 570 federally
recognized Native Nations within its territorial borders.6 Other statutes
govern the United States’s relationship with Native Nations in Alaska and
Hawaii.7
Even beyond the specialized laws that regulate the United States’s
relationship with Indian Country directly, interactions between the United
States, Native Nations, and Native peoples have shaped law across a broad

5.

See, e.g., CHRISTIAN W. MCMILLEN, MAKING INDIAN LAW: THE HUALAPAI LAND CASE AND

THE BIRTH OF ETHNOHISTORY 91–98, 177–82 (2007) (documenting the adoption of the Marshall Trilogy

internationally, but in limited form as property rights only and without recognition of inherent tribal
sovereignty).
6. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1-5636 (2018).
7. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1642 (2017); Hawaiian Homes Commission Act of 1920, ch. 42, 42 Stat.
108 (1921) (later adopted by HAW. CONST. art. XII).
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range of subject-matter areas.8 The majority of treaties negotiated and
ratified by the United States in its first hundred years were with Native
Nations.9 Areas of law like the war powers, foreign relations, the territories,
and even immigration developed in the context of Indian affairs and owe
many of their characteristics—for better or for worse—to that history.10
So to experience the near invisibility of Native Nations and Native
peoples at Stanford Law School when American law is virtually teeming
with the legibility of Native people came as an unwelcome surprise. The first
mention of Natives came in my first-year History of American Law course
when an offhand comment during a lecture stated that Native Nations and
Native peoples no longer existed in any real form in the United States. I was
sitting in the front row of the class, as anxious and prepared as ever. The
story of the disappearing Indian was so deeply taken for granted that no one
questioned the comment, even as I sat next to my classmates. I was erased
by the first mention I heard of Native people while in law school and in a
class on the history of American law.
One way that Native people combat the active erasure of Indian Country
is to self-identify. In doing so, we put our bodies and our reputations between
the force of erasure and the furtherance of the American colonial project. To
face a Native person is not only to face the reemergence of an erased
history—it is to struggle with the difficult moral reality of being both a
constitutional democracy and a colonial power that has ruled through
conquest. To face a Native person is also to struggle with one’s ongoing
participation in the erasure of American colonialism—it is to struggle with
the “Indian” Halloween costumes, headdresses and playacting during
Thanksgiving, “land grab” games in elementary school, racialized mascots,
and the list goes on. For academics, facing the reality of Native history,
Indian Country, and the ongoing existence of Native people is to face the
possibility that previous projects have been incomplete or even incorrect
because of that erasure.
Simply put, recognizing Native people is difficult for non-Natives.
Because it is difficult, the typical response to self-identification is often
rejection. Rejection most often takes the form of disbelief or a series of
requests for evidence of “authentic” Native status. Questions like, “How
much Native American are you?” or “How did you find out that you were
Native American?” often follow. Even worse than the requests for evidence
8. Maggie Blackhawk, Federal Indian Law as Paradigm Within Public Law, 132 HARV. L. REV.
1787, 1806–45 (2019).
9. Id. at 1809–15.
10. Id. at 1806–45.
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are the conclusions without evidence, “funny, you don’t look that Native
American.” Unlike other forms of racialization, the modern racialization of
Native people doesn’t often provoke violence or disgust—it doesn’t inspire
feelings of inferiority or judgment. Instead, it forces Native people to work
endlessly to prove their very existence to non-Native evaluators—evaluators
with little or no understanding of Indian Country and with quite a bit invested
in its erasure.
These types of interactions can prove to be an incredible distraction and
can often deflect real reform. Rather than discussing and debating the law of
American colonialism and its impact on the laws of the United States, I was
often stuck addressing fundamentals—like the very existence of Native
Nations and Native people today. As the late, great Toni Morrison teaches,
this distraction is often by design:
[T]he function, the very serious function of racism . . . is distraction. It
keeps you from doing your work. It keeps you explaining over and over
again, your reason for being. Somebody says you have no language and so
you spend 20 years proving that you do. Somebody says your head isn’t
shaped properly so you have scientists working on the fact that it is.
Somebody says that you have no art so you dredge that up. Somebody says
that you have no kingdoms and so you dredge that up. None of that is
necessary. There will always be one more thing.11

There came a point in my law school tenure when the exhaustion drove
me toward different solutions. I had come to Stanford Law School to defend
Indian Country, tribal sovereignty, and the jurisdiction or power of Native
governments. My law school education had been thorough and rigorous. I
had trained in constitutional litigation with the very best, Pam Karlan, and
had studied the legislative process with Jane Schacter, who combined
theoretical inquiry with hands-on exercises in legislative drafting and
interpretation. Both women understood fundamentally the power of the law
as a tool for justice and had cut their teeth fighting alongside movements for
voting rights, LGBTQIA+ rights, and gender equality. I could not have asked
for better teachers.
But the language of equality and rights dominated my training, and the
erasure of Indian Country left it to me to explore how I might translate the
language of equality and rights into the language of power, sovereignty, and
jurisdiction. I had come to law school with the general understanding that
rights posed a threat to tribal sovereignty. “Rights” were often invoked as a

11. Toni Morrison, Black Studies Center Public Dialogue Pt. 2: A Humanist View 7 (May 30, 1975)
(emphasis omitted) (transcript available at https://perma.cc/47KA-DRYN).

ON POWER & INDIAN COUNTRY

45

means to undermine the sovereignty of Native Nations—especially the rights
of non-Natives. The federal rights of non-Natives trumped inherent tribal
sovereignty. Contrary to the simple story, federal rights undermined justice
in Indian Country.
I soon learned that “equality” posed as much of a threat to tribal
sovereignty as did rights. Equality had structured the doctrine of race
jurisprudence, and by “reasoning from race,” the women’s rights movement
had shaped an equality doctrine of its own.12 I had been drawn to law school
and trained in the law by women deeply entrenched in the struggle for gender
equality. These women had inspired me by seizing and wielding power—
often together with other women. But the tools of liberation that they
offered—those born of the civil rights movement—were in direct conflict
with the lessons of Indian Country.
Most law students are familiar with the backlash against the civil rights
movement that took aim at race-based remedial legislation. Allan Bakke still
takes center stage in introductory courses on constitutional law, which study
in depth the 1978 case where Bakke fractured the Supreme Court with his
challenge to the University of California, Davis’s admission policies.13
Fewer are familiar with the far less fractured opinion that the Court issued
just three months earlier, foreshadowing Bakke.
In March of 1978, the Court decided Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe.14 The issues in the 6-2 opinion must have seemed far more mundane
at the time—not even controversial enough to inspire separate opinions.
Perhaps the only notable sign of controversy would have been the unlikely
pairing of Justice Thurgood Marshall and Chief Justice Warren Burger in
dissent.15 But the dissent hadn’t generated enough passion even in Justice
Marshall to exceed three sentences—one of them cribbed from the lower
court.16 The balance of the Court joined an opinion written by Justice
Rehnquist that was so loosely reasoned that it should have generated outrage
on that basis alone.
Mark David Oliphant and Daniel B. Belgarde arrived at the Supreme
Court to challenge their convictions under the 1973 Suquamish Nation Law
and Order Code as violating their Fifth Amendment right to due process.

12. SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS
REVOLUTION 1–8 (2011); see also Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex
Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 953–56 (2002).
13. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
14. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
15. Id. at 212 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
16. Id. (quoting Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 1976)).
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Oliphant and Belgarde had been indicted and convicted for the exotic crimes
of assaulting a Suquamish police officer, resisting arrest, and for engaging
in a high-speed car chase that ended with Belgarde’s vehicle colliding with
a police car. But the most dispositive fact of the case was that Oliphant and
Belgarde were white.
The Suquamish Nation, like many Native Nations, has a constitutional
government with tribal courts and a criminal code. Living within the
reservation, Oliphant and Belgarde had chosen to reside within the Nation’s
borders. They had each recognized the Nation’s government long enough to
take accurate aim at Suquamish police officers and patrol cars. But the
Supreme Court ruled in favor of Oliphant and Belgarde and held that the
Suquamish Nation had no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians—even nonIndians who had committed crimes within Indian Country.
For Oliphant and Belgarde, the language of rights opened the doors of
the Supreme Court. The men structured their merits brief around the tensions
between historical injustice and a modern liberalism born of the 1970s and
steeped in Rawls, rights, and equality:17
It is asserted that a sense of mea culpa permeates public policy and some
judicial decisions by . . . remembering only the past subjugation of Indian
tribes . . . , without consideration of the benefits, rights, privileges and
immunities received by all people within the United States under the
Constitution . . . . It is now argued that as to some non-Indians those rights,
privileges and immunities while on an Indian reservation within the United
States are being sacrificed by the application to them of the concept of
independent Indian tribal sovereignty . . . .18

In both Bakke and Oliphant, the Court resolved the tensions between
present day claims to equality and historical injustice by leaning into
equality. But in Oliphant, the Court was able to foster an uncontroversial
17. John Rawls first published his Theory of Justice in 1971, and it quickly took hold within the
legal academy and beyond. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 102 (1971) (“The natural distribution is
neither just nor unjust; nor is it unjust that persons are born into society at some particular position. These
are simply natural facts.”); see also KATRINA FORRESTER, IN THE SHADOW OF JUSTICE: POSTWAR
LIBERALISM AND THE REMAKING OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (2019); Katrina Forrester, The Future of
Political Philosophy, BOS. REV. (Sept. 17, 2019), https://perma.cc/TAT4-UD9K (describing the
influence of Rawls as: “[L]iberal egalitarians tended to insist that what mattered were institutional
solutions to current inequalities; past injustices weren’t relevant, and arguments that relied on historical
claims were rejected. That meant that demands for reparations for slavery and other historical injustices
made by Black Power and anti-colonial campaigns in the late 1960s and 1970s were rejected too. It also
meant that political philosophers in the Rawlsian strain often read later objections to the universalist
presumptions of American liberalism as identitarian challenges to equality, rather than as critiques
informed by the history of imperialism and decolonization.”).
18. Brief for Petitioners at 26–27, Oliphant, 435 U.S. 191 (No. 76-5729), 1977 WL 189288.
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consensus opinion by invoking and manipulating the doctrines of American
colonialism. It created what I call the “dormant plenary power doctrine” by
applying the worst of a Taney Court opinion.19 Yet, the modern Supreme
Court put even Taney to shame by rejecting his deference to the political
branches.20 The Court in Oliphant even drew on a late nineteenth-century
Supreme Court opinion, crafted in the early spirit of American eugenics and
scientific racism, that presumed that people of one race could never govern
people of another race fairly.21 Yet, the language of colonialism garnered far
less outrage and controversy than the language of rights in Bakke. Erasure is
quite effective.
Equality boiled down to “equality of opportunity” or being welcomed
into the halls of power and public resources on the same terms as all others.
To the extent that equality offered more than simple formality, it aspired to
“integration.” Indian Country had seen a form of integration before. The
Dawes Act, passed in 1887, began the era of allotment, or efforts to break up
and sell off the last of Native land to non-Natives.22 One justification for
selling off Native land for pennies on the dollar was that the “savages” might
be better “civilized” by integrating non-Native settlers with Native people.23
But allotment failed to civilize. Its only real achievement was the dismantling
of institutions in which Native people wielded power—majority-minority
institutions like Native governments. Allotment was ultimately deemed an
abject failure and was formally repudiated by the United States forty years
later.24
But the blunt tool of integration lived on—still unable to distinguish
between segregated institutions and majority-minority institutions where
minorities wield power. It lives on today through the promise of “diversity.”
Diversity aspires to unmake segregation by reshaping public institutions into

19. Blackhawk, supra note 8, at 1835–38.
20. Id.
21. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210–12 (majority opinion) (describing an argument that to subject nonNative people to Native courts would “tr[y] them, not by their peers, nor by the customs of their people,
nor the law of their land, but by . . . a different race” (second alteration in original) (quoting Ex parte
Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571 (1883))).
22. See Dawes Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331–342
(2018)).
23. See, e.g., Ross R. Cotroneo & Jack Dozier, A Time of Disintegration: The Coeur d’Alene and
the Dawes Act, 5 W. HIST. Q. 405, 405 (1974) (“Under another provision of the [Dawes Act], those lands
remaining after distribution of allotments to the Indians were to be sold to white settlers. . . . [I]t was
hoped that the resultant close intermingling of the two cultures would result in the Indians’ more rapid
acceptance of the white man’s ways.”).
24. See Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 5101–5129).
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a mirror image of the public. But the deep irony is that, in a system driven
by majority power, statistical mirroring of numerical minorities results in the
entrenchment of minority status. Twenty percent will never wield power in
a system that worships fifty-one percent. For Native people—who often
constitute the statistical asterisk in every study—diversity threatens every
institution where Native people govern.
Equality also threatened the very foundations of federal Indian law.
Title 25 of the United States Code—captioned “Indians”—provides laws,
power, and resources for Native Nations and Native peoples only. Others are
not welcomed into the halls of “Indian” power and resources on equal
footing. In fact, the same backlash against civil rights seen in Bakke came
first to federal Indian law through a 1974 challenge to a government hiring
preference for Native people.25 The Supreme Court avoided an equality
challenge by holding that being “Indian” was a political category and not a
racial category.26 To hold otherwise, the Court recognized, would mean that
“an entire Title of the United States Code (25 U.S.C.) would be effectively
erased and the solemn commitment of the Government toward the Indians
would be jeopardized.”27 Equality had the potential to effectively erase all of
federal Indian law and its recognition of inherent tribal sovereignty.
In my final year at Stanford Law School, I saw the first glimmer of a
different path forward. Janet Cooper Alexander introduced me to “power,”
and I learned the dynamics of how power worked over time and between
sovereigns in her class on the federal courts. She was also patient enough to
nod supportively after class while I pestered her with analogies between
federal Indian law and all facets of public law—she took particular interest
in the parallels between the Indian wars and the war on terror, her subject of
specialty at the time. Rather than equality, federal Indian law had long been
crafted in the language of power, and it was through our discussions of power
that I finally found my way toward a solution.
Between her supportive nods, Janet convinced me that I could bring the
lessons of Indian Country to the academy by publishing academic articles.
Erasure had left federal Indian law in a constant state of precarity. Fighting
that erasure in the academy might ultimately change the law. Janet mentored
me through my first article and helped me find my way into the legal academy.

25. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
26. Id. at 553 n.24.
27. Id. at 552 (“If these laws, derived from historical relationships and explicitly designed to help
only Indians, were deemed invidious racial discrimination, an entire Title of the United States Code (25
U.S.C.) would be effectively erased and the solemn commitment of the Government toward the Indians
would be jeopardized.”).
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II. DAYS OF 2017
It wasn’t until I looked for an academic job that I learned how difficult
it would be to bring Indian Country into the legal academy. My first lesson
was to learn how controversial it was to believe that law matters. Hiring
committees quickly branded me a “formalist.” They framed my project, in
the most generous light, as interested in the law as written and the stability
of law over time. In the least flattering light, some questioned whether I was
aware of my own normative presuppositions, and some even considered my
project anti-intellectual.
Legal realism and the critical legal studies movement reign supreme in
the legal academy, and they remain convinced that the law is politics all the
way down. Some even believe that the law itself is the source of
subordination. Based on the simple story, they are right. The law had
sanctioned slavery and Jim Crow segregation. Breaking the law, through
protest or through the violence of war, brought about justice. But the simple
story never holds in Indian Country. It was the breaking of law that furthered
American colonialism, and it was through enforcing adherence to the law as
written—in treaties and statutes—that Native Nations found justice.
However imperfect, the recognition of inherent tribal sovereignty and the
framework of United States law that fostered self-governance within Indian
Country were born from the rigorous belief that law matters.
The critical legal studies movement has been taken to task over rights
and its claim that rights are slippery terms, devoid of meaning.28 Black
scholars, closer to the movement, declared in passionate terms the meaning
of rights to their communities.29 But the critical legal studies movement
hasn’t yet been taken to task over the meaning of power to Native
communities and the central role of law in mitigating American colonialism.
Natives have long leveraged formal legal channels to protect the recognition
of inherent tribal sovereignty. Non-Natives, hungry for Native land, were the
source of subordination, not the legal system.
But my belief in the law was as puzzling to hiring committees as my
discomfort with equality and rights. Interest in my work was often coupled

28. See, e.g., Robin L. West, Tragic Rights: The Rights Critique in the Age of Obama, 53 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 713, 714–16, 715 n.8, 716 n.13 (2011) (reviewing the literature and describing the 1980s
as the genesis of the “rights critique” by Critical Legal Studies scholars, whom others sometimes called
“rights critics”).
29. See, e.g., Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1364–66 (1988); Patricia J. Williams,
Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401,
403–05 (1987).
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with confusion with where I might fit in the pantheon of the legal academy
or whether I might ever achieve recognition at all. My project highlighted
the voices of minorities and took particular interest in excavating levers of
power for the marginalized and vulnerable. But I often confessed doubt at
the ability of rights and courts to foster that power. I focused instead on
legislatures, the law, and distributed sovereignty through local control.
Indian Country taught me that John Hart Ely had gotten it wrong with respect
to courts and Native peoples.30 I witnessed firsthand that it was Congress and
not the courts that had protected Indian Country—most recently in 2013,
with the tiniest step toward a legislative fix for Oliphant in the Violence
Against Women Reauthorization Act.31 Judicial activism often meant
furthering the colonial project—at times imposing seemingly liberal values
while ignoring the law.32 Rather than rights, it was power or local control
that mitigated colonialism.
Luckily, despite the confusion I carried into every interview like
reservation dust, I still found my first academic home at the University of
Pennsylvania Law School.
III. DAYS OF 2027?
It is far too soon to say whether or not I have been able to bring the
lessons of Indian Country into the legal academy. At the time I sit and write
this Essay, I have only just begun my third year of teaching at Penn Law. In
the past two years, I have developed classes, mentored students, and started
new research projects. However, more than changing the academy, the
academy has changed me.
I came to the academy quite convinced that constitutional law offered
little to my project. Federal Indian law has long rejected the frame of

30. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 135–79
(1980) (crafting a careful analysis of how to best “facilitat[e] the representation of minorities,” but
viewing “minorities” entirely through the black–white binary paradigm).
31. See Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 904, 127 Stat.
54, 120–23 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1304 (2018)) (recognizing inherent tribal court
jurisdiction over non-Indian criminal defendants who commit a crime of domestic or dating violence
against a partner who is a tribal member, reversing Oliphant’s complete stripping of recognition of tribal
court jurisdiction over non-Indian criminal defendants).
32. See, e.g., Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2055–56 (2014) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (joining with Justice Thomas’s dissent from the Court’s upholding of tribal sovereign
immunity and writing separately to further clarify that her dissent is rooted in concerns over the overreach
of sovereign immunity more generally); City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S. 197,
202–03 (2005) (Ginsburg, J.) (crafting out of equitable doctrines a limitation on a Native Nation’s ability
to assert jurisdiction over land, because municipal, county, and state governments had relied on the
Nation’s absence for tax and governance purposes).
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constitutional law,33 just like it has long rejected the tool of rights. Over time,
I came to see the heart of this rejection more clearly: After Marbury, the
Supreme Court is the final arbiter of constitutional meaning. The Supreme
Court has grown increasingly hostile in recent decades to the recognition of
inherent tribal sovereignty. Calling something “constitutional law” places
the Court as the forum of last resort. Calling something “not constitutional
law” moves the locus of control into the political branches—the Congress or
the executive. Federal Indian law implicates the Constitution by its very
nature in that it implicates the power and reach of the national government.
In the past two years, two events brought me to see this rejection as more
strategic than accurate.
The first occurred a few weeks after I started at Penn Law:
Constitutional law brought me home. In the fall of 2017, the national
government for the Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Ojibwe, the
Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, called for a formal convention to rethink our
antiquated constitution. The history is a bit vague as to whether this was the
first formal call for a constitutional convention, but it certainly was the first
formal call in living memory. The structure of the Minnesota Chippewa
Tribe is a bit of a rare gem in Indian Country. Unlike other more centralized
Native Nations recognized by the United States, the Minnesota Chippewa
Tribe has a federal system. One constitution governs the national
government, but that national government oversees six distinct bands that
govern separately six geographically disparate reservations. The six bands
of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe have governed so independently for the
last eighty years that few still recognize them as a federal system.
But although the structure of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe is a gem,
its constitution is not. It was initially drafted and ratified in 1936—just two
years after the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA). The IRA
created a formal infrastructure for the recognition of Native Nations and
established parameters by which Native Nations could engineer
constitutional governments that the United States would recognize.
Hundreds of Native Nations adopted written constitutions in the years
following 1934, making it one of the most generative constitutional moments
in American history. But many of these constitutions were modified versions
of a “model” constitution circulated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs.34 These

33. See Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 431, 440 (2005); Angela R. Riley, Essay, Native Nations and the Constitution: An Inquiry into
“Extra-Constitutionality,” 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 173, 199 (2017).
34. See FELIX S. COHEN, ON THE DRAFTING OF TRIBAL CONSTITUTIONS xxiii-xxix, 173–77 (David
E. Wilkins ed., 2006).
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model or “IRA constitutions” lacked separation of powers and instead
constituted a “council” that would undertake all government functions—
executive, legislative, and judicial—without checks and balances. The
Minnesota Chippewa Tribe had a quintessential IRA constitution.
The federal government had also coerced the Nation in the 1960s to
amend its constitution and to limit its membership to individuals of a certain
“blood quantum.”35 Blood quantum identified Native individuals at a point
in history and classified them as a hundred percent Native. Descendants of
that individual, if they were not parented by two one hundred percent
individuals, would each be a fraction of that earlier individual—fifty percent
for a first-generation descendant, twenty-five percent for a secondgeneration descendant, and on and on until there were no more Native
people. Blood quantum is a nineteenth-century racial construct that the
national government adopted within federal Indian law and policy in order
to limit its obligations to Native Nations. If there were no Native people,
there were no obligations. The 1936 constitution established citizenship
criteria that resembled the birthright citizenship of the United States:
Children of Minnesota Chippewa Tribe members were members. But the
federal government threatened in the 1960s to unilaterally withdraw its treaty
obligations if the Nation did not amend its membership criteria to include a
blood-quantum requirement.
The Minnesota Chippewa Tribe called a constitutional convention in
late summer of 2017 to open a conversation about how the constitution might
be amended or rewritten. My mother and I attended our first constitutional
convention meeting that fall, and I continued to attend the meetings as they
were held on each band’s reservation. The convention meetings were deeply
emotional and deeply inspiring. Many members and descendants expressed
frustration with the tribal government structure—lack of separation of
powers, lack of clarity of the powers of each band, and the “blood quantum”
membership criteria topped the list of common criticisms.
A few months later, I was appointed by the council of the Fond du Lac
Band to serve as a senior constitutional advisor to the president. The position
pressed me to answer a range of legal questions: I researched constitutionalconvention procedure and best practices developed by other Native Nations.
I struggled with whether the Nation should or could remove the provision,
standard to many IRA constitutions, that required the Secretary of the
Interior to approve all amendments before they would take effect. I waded
deep into the murky legal waters created by drafting a constitution under the
35. See generally JILL DOERFLER, THOSE WHO BELONG: IDENTITY, FAMILY, BLOOD, AND
CITIZENSHIP AMONG THE WHITE EARTH ANISHINAABEG 1–8 (2015).
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shadow of colonialism. More than answers, my research began to raise for
me questions about the United States Constitution and how the national
government wielded such power over Indian Country.
The second event occurred in my second semester at Penn Law:
Constitutional law came home to me. I came to the academy staunchly
committed to studying the field of legislation. Indian Country had taught me
to be wary of the Constitution, and my training at Stanford Law had further
solidified the sense that constitutional litigation offered few useable tools to
empower marginalized people. But my colleagues at Penn Law read my
scholarship on petitioning and the First Amendment’s Petition Clause36 and
decided that I would teach introductory constitutional law as part of my
teaching package.
I began my preparation for the class by surveying the field for
casebooks in constitutional law. The Sullivan and Feldman casebook offered
finely edited cases and spartan commentary that fostered focused attention
on the important details of the doctrine. The Brest and Levinson casebook
offered deep context and history. But across the range of casebooks, the
complete erasure of Native Nations, Native peoples, and American
colonialism was striking.37 I had entered the academy, in part, to combat the
erasure that I had encountered in law school and beyond. Now, in my first
year on the faculty, I was going to become complicit in that erasure simply
because I lacked the materials to do otherwise.
In that moment, I began crafting the article that became Federal Indian
Law as Paradigm Within Public Law, an article I published in May 2019 in
the Harvard Law Review.38 In it, I make the case that constitutional law
scholars and historians have been getting it wrong because they have failed
to center Native Nations and American colonialism in their understanding of
the Constitution. The article isn’t a casebook, and it doesn’t identify every
connection between federal Indian law and American public law. But it
offers a tool to begin to combat the erasure of Native Nations and Native
peoples within the legal academy and within the practice of law. It also
serves as a strong call for others to join me in this effort.
Combatting the erasure of Native Nations, Native peoples, and
American colonialism will likely ensure that never again will a Native law

36. See generally Maggie McKinley, Lobbying and the Petition Clause, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1131
(2016); Maggie McKinley, Petitioning and the Making of the Administrative State, 127 YALE L.J. 1538
(2018).
37. Blackhawk, supra note 8, at 1793–94, 1794 n.15 (surveying constitutional law casebooks for
mention of Native Nations, Native people, or federal Indian law).
38. Id.

54

WOMEN & LAW

student sit in the front row of a classroom and have their identity erased by
the only exposure they may have in law school to Indian Country. But
combatting this erasure could have broader implications also, and those
broader implications cannot come too soon.
In Indian Country, we are often reminded how much erasure shapes the
law. A case currently pending before the Supreme Court highlights the
stakes: Sharp v. Murphy (previously known as Royal v. Murphy and
Carpenter v. Murphy).39 In Murphy, the Court is asked whether certain parts
of Oklahoma are within the borders of the Muscogee Creek Nation
reservation.40 The law governing Murphy is well settled. In a unanimous
2016 opinion drafted by Justice Thomas, the Court held that Congress must
clearly and explicitly intend to diminish reservation borders.41 In Murphy,
there is no such clear and explicit textual evidence. In fact, there is so little
evidence supporting petitioner’s arguments that the petitioner chose to open
its brief not with extensive documentation of congressional intent, but with
a photo of Tulsa—a city that would be within the reservation if the Court
upholds the Tenth Circuit’s decision and resolves the case in favor of
Murphy.42
During oral argument last term, the conservative Justices abandoned
their usual commitments: Justice Kavanaugh, for example, abandoned his
“textualism” to ask why “historical practice” shouldn’t inform the text of
congressional statutes.43 Mr. Murphy’s attorney tried to remind Justice
Kavanaugh of the law—that the text must be clear and explicit. But Justice
Kavanaugh continued unabated, stating that this case was “massively”
different because of the “number of people affected.”44 Chief Justice Roberts
deviated from calling “balls and strikes” thrown by Congress to ponder how
a businessperson in Tulsa might feel if the Court held that Tulsa was inside
a reservation.45 Rather than focusing on the law, the conservatives on the
Court seemed poised to decide the case on the imagined feelings of nonNatives living in Tulsa—residents that the Court assumed, without polling,
would be shocked to learn that they lived within the borders of an Indian
reservation. In this way, erasure often becomes law.
39. No. 17-1107 (U.S. filed Feb. 6, 2018).
40. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 2, Murphy, No. 17-1107 (U.S. July 23, 2018). Murphy addresses
only the Muscogee Creek Nation reservation, but the decision could be far reaching and could result in
as much as half of Oklahoma falling within the borders of a reservation. Id.
41. Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016).
42. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 40, at 3.
43. Transcript of Oral Argument at 55–56, Murphy, No. 17-1107 (U.S. Nov. 27, 2018).
44. Id. at 56–57.
45. Id. at 50–53.

